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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) devices are becoming in-
creasingly important. These devices are often resource-limited,
hindering rigorous enforcement of security policies. Assessing
the vulnerability of IoT devices is an important problem, but
analyzing their firmware is difficult for a variety of reasons,
including requiring the purchase of devices. This paper finds that
analyzing companion apps to these devices for clues to security
vulnerabilities can be an effective strategy. Compared to device
hardware and firmware, these apps are easy to download and
analyze. A key finding of this study is that the communication
between an IoT device and its app is often not properly encrypted
and authenticated and these issues enable the construction of
exploits to remotely control the devices. To confirm the vulnera-
bilities found, we created exploits against five popular IoT devices
from Amazon by using a combination of static and dynamic
analyses. We also did a larger study, finding that analyzing 96
popular IoT devices only required analyzing 32 companion apps.
Among the conservative findings, 50% of the apps corresponding
to 38% of the devices did not use proper encryption techniques
to secure device to companion app communication. Finally, we
discuss defense strategies that developers can adapt to address
the lessons from our work.
Index Terms—Security; Internet of Things; Android Apps;
Companion Apps
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices 1 worldwide
is predicted to reach 20 billion by 2020 [1]. Designing
secure solutions in this domain is challenging as devices
are typically limited in resources. Consequently, security is
a permanent concern. As a concrete example, in October
2016, the Mirai malware compromised millions of IoT devices
around the world and used them to launch the largest DDoS
attack ever recorded [2]. In the smart-home scenario, security
vulnerabilities in IoT devices could compromise safety at
home [3].
IoT devices are compatible with multiple cloud-based
software stacks (e.g., SmartApps in the SmartThings cloud [4],
Alexa Skills [5], etc.). Prior work has found security vulnerabil-
ities introduced by some of these stacks [6], [7]. Unfortunately,
a gap remains in that the device may have vulnerabilities out-of-
the-box that are independent of security of high-level software
stacks. Unfortunately, techniques for security analysis of device
software itself remains an art and poorly understood. For
1We may refer to IoT devices as smart devices (or just devices) and the
apps that control these devices as companion apps (or just app).
example, a white paper by Veracode describes vulnerabilities
in 6 IoT devices, including SmartThings Hub, Wink Hub,
Wink Relay, and MyQ Garage, but not how to analyze such
vulnerabilities in a systematic way. One solution would be
for a security analyst to inspect the firmware binary on the
device, but that is often hard to access [8] and challenging to
analyze [9].
This paper proposes an indirect and simpler way of assessing
the security of IoT devices by analyzing their companion apps
and the interaction with the device’s firmware. Our intuition is
that if this interaction between the companion app and device
firmware is not implemented with good security principles,
the device’s firmware is potentially insecure and vulnerable
to attacks. In our experience, most IoT devices on the market
today are released with companion apps for both Android and
iOS so that users could control these devices directly from
their smartphone, thus permitting such analysis.
Our hypothesis is that the analysis of these apps can throw
substantial light on potential vulnerabilities in devices and
even help security analysts develop proof-of-concept exploits
to induce the device manufacturers to verify the vulnerabilities
and fix them. To validate the hypothesis, we analyze multiple
smartphone apps to discover potential vulnerabilities and, from
that, create proof-of-concept attacks that could allow either
a local or remote attacker to completely compromise the
device, including issuing arbitrary commands to them or update
their firmware without ever touching the device physically.
These apps play an important role in the secure operation of
smart devices. In particular, they are responsible for the initial
device configuration, i.e., these apps set up the communication
channel with the device with supposedly proper encryption
and authentication. Because of this important role, IoT apps
need to encode sensitive communication data, such as the
type of encryption being used, and even encryption keys. This
information can be valuable for an attacker who wants to gain
control of the device. Moreover, in contrast to physical devices,
these apps are accessible to the general public through market
places (e.g., Google Play). It is, therefore, a sweet spot for
hackers to focus their efforts on.
In the security analysis of the smartphone apps, we par-
ticularly focus on the security of communication between an
IoT device and its app. Any flaws could enable a range of
attacks that can result in complete control of the IoT device.
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We analyzed smartphone apps for 96 of top-selling WiFi
and Bluetooth-enabled devices on Amazon. There were 32
unique apps for these devices (e.g., devices were from the
same vendor and sometimes different vendors shared apps) and
then developed proof-of-concept attacks on 5 of the devices.
For example, we find that an Amazon top-seller smart plug
from TP-Link [10] shares the same hard-coded encryption
key for all the devices of a given product line and that the
initial configuration of the device is established through the app
without proper authentication. Using this information, we were
able to create a spoofing attack to gain control of this device2.
Note that this issue can be replicated in all other TP-Link
devices that use the same app.
This paper makes the following contributions:
Empirical Study. We show the value of analyzing compan-
ion apps as a useful vulnerability analysis technique for devices
by conducting two studies to assess the security of app-device
communication by analyzing companion apps corresponding
to the device. These studies consider key security aspects in
this context, namely, encryption, authentication, and network
protocols. The first study involved a detailed analysis of four
different apps (for five devices, with two devices sharing an app)
and then creating concrete exploits. A second study analyzed
32 apps for 96 devices to find extent of similar features that
could potentially enable an exploit.
Efficiency. We found that we only had to analyze 4 apps
for the 5 devices actually purchased and 32 apps for 96
devices overall. There was extensive sharing of apps among
devices. Thus, it can be significantly more efficient to analyze
companion apps as compared to device firmware.
Findings and Lessons. We found lack of encryption in 31%
of the apps analyzed and use of hardcoded keys in 19% of all
the apps—thus, at least 50% of the apps were potentially seri-
ously vulnerable to exploits (these apps corresponded to 37 out
of 96 devices considered). Many of these apps controlled their
devices via local communication or via broadcast messages,
including UDP messages. Based on our in-depth analysis of
4 of the apps, we found that leveraging these weaknesses to
create actual exploits is not challenging. A remote attacker
simply has to find a way of getting the exploit either on the
user’s smartphone in the form of an unprivileged app or a
script on the local network. We then discuss potential defense
strategies.
Spoofing Attacks. We provide detailed evidence of the
importance of our findings by building proof-of-concept attacks
on randomly selected, from a list of popular IoT devices on
Amazon, five IoT devices. We purchased these devices prior
to the analysis. We were successful in creating attack apps (or
scripts) that could execute arbitrary commands on the device.
The attacks were successful even if the device had previously
been paired with a legitimate app.
Figure 1: Example of IoT setup.
II. CONTEXT, GOAL, AND QUESTIONS
A. Context
Most manufacturers of IoT devices provide a smartphone
application and cloud services to monitor and control their
devices. Communication between the device and its companion
app is often established over the local network using some
wireless protocol such as Zigbee and Z-Wave [11]. When
the device and the smartphone are in distinct networks or
the IoT setup does not support local network connectivity3,
the cloud server acts as a proxy for communication. An IoT
app sends the message intended for a device to the cloud
server and the cloud server relays the message to the device.
Similarly, a message from a device can be relayed to the
IoT app through the cloud. Figure 1 illustrates an example
setup with a router/hub and with the cloud. Setups without
one or both of these elements are possible. For example, it
is possible that only local communication is allowed (i.e., no
cloud) and that the app and the device communicate directly
(i.e., through the router). Hubs are especially useful to enable
communication with resource-constrained devices that do not
need to fully implement a network stack.
In this context, pairing is the process of establishing a
communication channel between an app and a device. A
prevalent hypothesis made by users is that, once established,
this channel is secure. The goal of this paper is to assess this
hypothesis, i.e., this study evaluates whether the app-device
channel is properly secured. To achieve this goal we analyze
companion apps for vulnerabilities and then confirm them by
creating exploits. We make the following assumptions on these
exploits:
• that an adversary has access to the local network;
• that an adversary uses a rogue app or script to control the
device without user knowledge.
To illustrate a potential use case for such exploits, consider,
for instance, the scenario of a burglar trying to break into
your smart home. The first step is to gain access to your WiFi
network using some public technique [13]. The burglar does
not need to succeed in all attempts. The next step is to detect
2A video illustrating a counterfeit app in action can be found at https:
//figshare.com/s/d5bc439a7527df358f5f
3Tuya Smart [12] is an example framework where the companion app can
only communicate with the device through the cloud.
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periods of time when the house would be empty. For that, the
burglar could monitor the network and find use-patterns to
identify periods of occupation. Finally, the burglar would use
a rogue app or script to control a door handle and invade the
house. This scenario illustrates the importance of assessing
whether the IoT device is susceptible to adversaries leveraging
information obtained by analyzing the companion app.
B. Goal and Questions
The goal of this study is to assess whether the app-device
communication is secure. We assume this communication
occurs through the local network; remote communication
through the cloud is out of the scope for this work. We also
assume that an adversary targeting the IoT device would use
either a rogue app or script to control the device without user
knowledge. We propose a non-comprehensive list of questions
to determine the attack surface on the apps. These questions
are related to encryption, authentication, and communication,
which is where vulnerabilities typically manifest.
Q1) Is the key hardcoded? A malicious developer could
counterfeit messages if she has access to secret keys. Hard-
coded keys are problematic as they are encoded literally in
code. Intuitively, hardcoded keys could be mined by reverse-
engineering the app, even when the code is obfuscated. For
example, if a crypto API is used, one could find the key by
monitoring the actual parameters of crypto library functions,
whose names cannot be obfuscated and whose intent can be
found from public documentation. In other cases, the developer
may have chosen to implement a custom crypto function, but
one could discover these functions by the ratio of mathematical
instructions in the function body, as Caballero and colleagues
did [14], and then use a similar method to mine the key.
Q2) Does the app use local communication? When the
IoT app and the corresponding device are in the same
network, local communication may be used. Unfortunately,
local communication protocols do not enforce the same security
guarantees compared to remote communication. For example, it
is uncommon to check identities with HTTPS/SSL certificates
in local communication. In contrast, in the scenario where
local communication is forbidden (i.e., cloud relays messages
to apps and devices), an attacker would have to make a bigger
effort to forge HTTPS/SSL certificates of the parties involved.
Q3) Does the app send broadcast messages? Broadcast
messages are frequently used in IoT setups to discover devices
and to enable direct app-device communication when there
is no hub/gateway in the setup. Their use, unfortunately, can
put a smart home at risk. Adversaries can, for instance, sniff4
the response of devices to broadcast messages, which often
include sensitive data such as the internal state of the device.
Q4) Does the app use any well-known protocol with
vulnerabilities? Different protocols tailored to IoT deployments
exist and some of these protocols are known to be vulnerable
to attacks. According to Al-Fuqaha and colleagues, a total
of seven application protocols are more frequently used in
4This ability to sniff WiFi messages depends on the distance to the router.
Table I: CVE vulnerabilities in major IoT protocols.
Protocol # Vulnerabilities Example
MQTT 13 CVE-2017-9868
SIP 59 CVE-2018-0332
UPnP 346 CVE-2016-6255
SSDP 17 CVE-2017-5042
IoT deployments [15]. Using the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) database [16], we find vulnerability reports
in four of these IoT protocols, namely, MQTT [17], SIP [18],
UPnP [19] and SSDP [20]. Table I shows the number of
reported issues and the ID of an example issue. For instance,
the UPnP vulnerability CVE-2016-6255 allows remote attackers
to write arbitrary files to the device file system [21]. Note that
UPnP is the protocol with the largest number of reported issues.
III. FINDING AND CONFIRMING VULNERABILITIES
This section presents details of how we carried out a
vulnerability assessment by analyzing the companion apps and
then confirming the assessment by crafting proof-of-concept
exploits for a selection of IoT devices. It describes the criterion
for selecting apps to analyze (III-A), discusses the analysis
used to answer the questions posed on Sections II-B and III-B,
and describes each exploit in detail (III-C).
A. App Selection Criterion
To select apps for this part of our study, we examined the 96
top-selling WiFi and Bluetooth devices on the Amazon website
by popularity. We then restricted the resulting set to devices
from the categories smart plugs, bulbs, or IR controllers that
use Wi-Fi—largely for affordability and form-factor reasons
and because Wi-Fi is popular and provides a potential attack
surface if an attacker can execute code anywhere on the same
network (e.g., via an app, malicious email, malicious device,
or downloaded executable code on a computer on the same
network). A total of 54 devices satisfied this criterion. From
these 54 devices, we randomly selected (and purchased) 5
devices to run our analysis. Somewhat to our surprise, we
found that two of the devices we selected use the same app
(as they belong to the same manufacturer). Consequently, this
section focuses on these four companion apps. For each of the
apps, we did a detailed vulnerability analysis and then also
developed exploits.
B. Vulnerability Analysis
This section details the tools we used to determine app-device
protocol features that could permit remote or local attacks on
the device. We analyzed each companion app with respect to
the questions from Section II-B. We then identified a potential
attack path in each app and confirmed the path by creating a
proof-of-concept exploit. We describe the methodology used
to answer the questions and their use to find an exploit.
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1) Basic toolset functionality: We implemented a toolset
to help us do semi-automated analysis to answer the questions.
We found relying on just automated analysis to be error-prone.
For example, one of our tools looked for use of constant keys
in calls to encryption functions. But, we found that some of
the calls were not used on the communication paths between
the device and the app. Thus, for all of our analysis, we
used the tools as an aid to manual analysis. We also used the
JADX decompiler library [22] as well as some static analysis
tools [23].
Encryption Discovery. The encryption discovery component
looks for functions in the app that likely encrypt and decrypt
the data exchanged with the smart device. Those functions are
the first line of attack for adversaries [24]. With those functions,
one could, for example, eavesdrop on official communication
and infer the layout of messages and gain access to sensitive
data. The toolset uses two complementary heuristics to discover
these encryption functions. The first heuristic applies to the
case where developers use existing Java encryption APIs. The
second heuristic covers the case where developers implement
custom crypto functions instead of building on existing ones.
The toolset detects these functions by computing, for every
function declared in the app, the ratio between the number
of arithmetic and bitwise operations over the total number of
instructions. This heuristic has been previously used in prior
work [14], [25], [26].
Network Protocol Discovery. This component extracts infor-
mation about the communication protocol used between the
smart device and the companion app. More precisely, it looks
for calls to functions (in the app) from classes related to known
communication protocols. For example, for UDP, it looks for
calls to functions from java.net.DatagramSocket and, for
TCP, it looks for calls to functions from java.net.Socket.
This component reports a mapping from classes in the app
to communication protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP, HTTP, UPnP).
Note that there is no fundamental limitation that prevents our
infrastructure supporting other languages and protocols.
2) Answering the questions: We describe below the methodo-
logy we used to answer each of the questions from Section II-B
and then elaborate results.
Q1) Is the key hardcoded? The search for hardcoded keys
initiates from the output of the encryption discovery component,
which reports function likely related to encryption. When using
standard encryption libraries, we are able to automate the search
for secret keys by looking for javax.crypto.SecretKey,
which is the class denoting a key in the Java standard API. For
custom encryption, however, we manually inspect each method
returned by the encryption discovery, checking if the key is
present inside the method body or in usages of the method.
Q2) Does the app use local communication? The protocol
discovery component acts as guidance for the manual analysis.
Based on the function calls and protocol report, we manually
analyze the classes responsible for network calls and identify
whether the app uses local communication.
Q3) Does the app send broadcast messages? Identifying
whether broadcast messages are sent from the app to the smart
device is done by inspecting the classes responsible for making
network calls and looking for well-known broadcast addresses,
e.g., 255.255.255.255.
Q4) Does the app use any well-known protocol with
vulnerabilities? With the protocol discovery component, we
can identify transport, network, and application layer protocols
used on the app. After identifying these protocols, we look for
documented vulnerabilities for each protocol in the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database [16].
Results. Table II shows the answer to these questions for the
four selected apps. For each question, we used the labels yes
or no to indicate a positive answer or a negative answer, and
no encryption for the first question when the app uses no
encryption. The label yes indicate good practice whereas the
labels no and no encryption indicates a potential vulnerability
or an interesting attack surface for a potential exploit.
All four apps are found to use local communication with
the device and three of the apps also using broadcast commu-
nication, providing us with a potential attack surface to exploit
the devices. Three out of four apps do not use any encryption
to secure their communication with the device, providing us
with a compelling attack vector. Only one of the selected apps
(WeMo) uses an insecure version of a protocol. But WeMo
also does not use any encryption, thus providing a simpler
attack vector to exploit the device.
3) Finding Vulnerable Paths: After answering the posed
questions, we proceed to locate vulnerable paths in the given
app. We define a vulnerable path to be a sequence of function
calls that connect a source (e.g., a function that is called from
external input such as the user interface (UI)) to a sink (e.g., a
network method call) that an exploit may wish to compromise.
Analyzing the classes and functions in this path involved in the
preparation of a message to a sink helps the security analyst
generate an abstraction of the application behavior, an important
step to creating an exploit.
c.a()
AbsSmartDevice.invoke()
...TPUDPClient.a()
TPClientUtils.encode() UDPClient.b() Datagram.send()
UI
call
Network
call
Encryption
call
Figure 2: Path (simplified) from UI function to a network call.
Figure 2 illustrates a vulnerable path for the Kasa app. To
find this vulnerable path, we start by analyzing the output of
our toolset, i.e., classes and functions related to encryption,
authentication and network protocols. These elements are
potential sources of vulnerabilities. Considering the Kasa app,
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Table II: Potential Threats to Selected Apps.
App Avoid Hardcoded
Keys?
Avoid Local
Communication?
Avoid Broadcast
Messages?
Safe
Protocol?
Kasa for Mobile no no no yes
LIFX no encryption no no yes
WeMo no encryption no yes no
e-Control no encryption no no yes
for example, we start by inspecting the classes containing
usages of the UDP protocol (related to Q3). We discover that the
UDPClient class declares the network-related method b, which
calls datagramPacket.send(), a method from the standard
Java API to send UDP packets. As the method b includes a net-
work call, it could be flagged as a sink. Our analysis shows that
this class contains usages of broadcast addresses, representing
a potential attack surface. Then, we analyze backward the call
chain leading to this function looking for a UI method. While
doing it, we find another method present in the output of our
toolset (related to Q1), TPClientUtils.encode, contains
hardcoded keys that could also be exploited. We also identify
the function TPUDPCLient.a, responsible for building the
UDP packet. This function, while not showing a vulnerability
by itself, is responsible for building the UDP packet to be sent
and reveals the structure of the message. Finally, we discover
the calls to the UI obfuscated method c.a, which is the starting
point of this path. That is possible because of the programming
conventions of Android. More specifically, class c declares
several (button-related) event callback methods.
C. Exploits
Based on the vulnerable paths found, we created exploits
for each selected app. In the following, we describe in detail
the steps we took to create each exploit. Although this work
does not assume that an adversary would have physical access
to the device, we used physical devices in this experiment
to demonstrate our findings. The assumption we made on
the adversary is that she understands Java and she is able to
reverse engineer the Android application files (.apks). Also,
when cryptographic functions and keys are encountered, we do
not assume the adversary has enough computational power to
break the key by brute force. We believe that these assumptions
are similar to what a real-world attacker would deal with and
similar to the assumptions made in other studies [27], [28].
1) Finding an exploit for Kasa for Mobile: TP-Link Kasa is
the official app for controlling TP-Link-manufactured devices
from the smart home product line Kasa [29]. The exploit we
created consists of a rogue app that mimics the official TP-Link
app and takes control of a TP-Link smart plug. It is worth
noting that in principle, this app could run as code anywhere on
the same network, e.g., running as a script instead of app. At
the time of this writing, TP-Link’s smart plug was a top-seller
with over 12.000 customer reviews on the Amazon website [30]
showing an average rating of 4.4 out of 5 stars. We give an
analysis of its companion app below.
1 public static byte[] encode(byte[] data) {
2 byte seed = (byte) -85;
3 for (int i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
4 data[i] = (byte) (data[i] ^ seed);
5 seed = data[i];
6 }
7 return data;
8 }
Listing 1: TP-Link Kasa encryption function.
Q1) Is the key hardcoded? The Kasa app uses a custom
encryption function, Caesar cipher [31], that is known to be
easy to break. Listing 1 shows this function as it appears in
the app. Line 2 shows the hardcoded seed to encrypt the data.
Identifying the encryption function and its hardcoded seed gave
us hope of replicating the function in a rogue app on the same
network to control the device arbitrarily.
Q2) Does the app use local communication? By using the
network discovery component and manually inspecting the
code, we identified classes containing calls to UDP-related
methods. After inspecting these classes, we confirmed that
these methods are involved in the discovery and control of the
TP-Link devices on the local network. For instance, Listing 2
exhibits the function that discovers TP-Link devices in the
local network.
1 public static final String UDP_ADDRESS="255.255.255.255";
2 public void discoverLocal() {
3 String requestId = DiscoveryUtils.a();
4 tpDiscovery.broadcastDiscovery(...,UDP_ADDRESS,...);
5 ...
6 }
Listing 2: TP-Link Kasa function (simplified) used to
discover devices on the local network.
Q3) Does the app send broadcast messages? During our
analysis, we found the Kasa app uses broadcast messages to
discover and control the TP-Link devices. Line 1 from Listing 2
declares a constant variable holding a well-known broadcast
IPv4 address. This variable is then used in Line 4 to discover
TP-Link devices on the network.
Q4) Does the app use any well-known protocol with
vulnerabilities? Our analysis did not find usage of protocols
with documented vulnerabilities.
To confirm the vulnerabilities, we designed a proof-of-
concept exploit. The exploit consists of a rogue app on the
same network. We use both static analysis (i.e., inspection of
the decompiled code) and dynamic analysis (i.e., inspection
5
of the network traffic). The list below shows the keys steps to
create the exploit.
1) find a vulnerable path and encryption function;
2) discover the structure of exchanged messages;
3) discover what protocol is used to exchange messages;
4) implement pairing.
From one vulnerable path for the Kasa app (see Sec-
tion III-B3), we obtain access to the app’s encryption function
(step 1). With that function at hand, it is possible to monitor
the network traffic and read the contents of messages as to
understand their structure (step 2) and the IP addresses used
(step 3), which are critical for replication. Recall that the Caesar
cipher [31] is a symmetric (/invertible) encryption function. In
that case, we found that only broadcasting was used through
a single address. Finally, it is necessary to replicate pairing
(step 4). To our surprise, we found by inspection that a pairing
process was not needed to control the device. Pairing was used
to maintain the profile of users on TP-Link devices, but not
for its control.
Monitoring the Network. We used the popular traffic analyzer
Wireshark [32] to monitor the packets exchanged between
the Kasa app and the device. As the traffic was encrypted
we needed to implement a script to decrypt the monitored
messages; the script uses the symmetric cipher function from
Listing 1. This monitoring tool was used in two important
stages: (i) during the app-device pairing process and (ii)
while the app interacted with the device, e.g., turning the
plug “on” and “off”. During the pairing process, we found
that broadcast messages were exchanged while the app was
connected to the hotspot created by the device. We also
monitored the network when interacting with the device through
the app’s UI. Specifically, we repeated the “Turn Off” and
“Turn On” operation multiple times, observing that the contents
of the network packets did not change, validating the use
of a hardcoded key with a poor encryption method. We
also observed the use of broadcast messages during device
usage after pairing. We found that the app uses the following
message to discover and obtain the current status of the device–
{"system":{"get_sysinfo": }{}}. We also found that
"{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":0}}} was
the message for turning the device off.
Based on the analysis, we created a rogue app to control a
TP-Link smart plug device. Static analysis played an important
role to find vulnerable paths in the app whereas dynamic
analysis helped in understanding the communication protocol
and the messages exchanged. Recall that, during our analysis,
we noticed that the pairing process was not needed to control
the device. This is a severe flaw as the user would not even be
aware of an attack—the official app would still work as intended
even with a rogue app controlling the device simultaneously.
A video demonstrating the exploit is available from the link5.
2) Exploiting LIFX: LIFX [33] controls smart lights manu-
factured by LIFX, a company specialized in smart lights [34].
5Kasa exploit: https://figshare.com/s/d5bc439a7527df358f5f
The proof-of-concept exploit we developed is a script that takes
control of a light bulb. To develop the script, we first started
with finding answers to the four questions in Section II-B.
Q1) Is the key hardcoded? We found that no encryption or
authentication is used in the LIFX app.
Q2) Does the app use local communication? The LIFX app
uses UDP to communicate with the smart lights. As in the Kasa
case, we used the output of the protocol discovery component
to find that.
Q3) Does the app send broadcast messages? The app uses
broadcast messages. Listing 3 shows the class responsible
for sending these messages. Lines 5 and 6 refer to a fixed
broadcast address. We also found that the broadcast IP address
was identical to that present in the Kasa app. During our
analysis of the apps (discussed in Section IV), we noticed that
this broadcast address is commonly used in an IoT setup, as
it represents a special broadcast address that is used when a
device needs to send a broadcast packet to the network without
caring about a recipient’s address.
1 public final class UdpTransport ... { ...
2 static {
3 Object bn = InetAddress.getByName("255.255.255.255");
4 Intrinsics.a(bn,...);
5 ...
6 }
7 ...
8 }
Listing 3: Function (simplified) used by the LIFX app
showing usage of a broadcast address.
Q4) Does the app use any well-known protocol with
vulnerabilities? During our analysis, we did not find any usages
of protocols with known vulnerabilities in the LIFX app.
ColorController.setPowerState()
Intrinsics.b()
...UdpTransport.accept()Datagram.send()
UI
call
Network
call
Figure 3: Path (simplified) from UI function to a network call.
The path includes no encryption function.
The LIFX exploit consists of a script that sends UDP
broadcast messages to control the device. Similarly to the
Kasa exploit, we used static analysis to find a vulnerable
attack vector for the app. For that, we inspected the code
and discovered the UdpTransport class, responsible for
creating and sending the UDP messages (related the Q2).
While inspecting this class, we found that broadcast UDP
messages were sent through the UdpTransport.accept
method (related to Q3). Then, we analyzed the call chain
backwards leading to the UI function responsible for controlling
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the state of the smart light, i.e., turning it “on” and “off”–
ColorController.setPowerState, the starting point of
this path. Figure 3 shows this path.
By monitoring the network while using the LIFX app to
turn the lights “on” and “off”, we confirmed that broadcast
messages were exchanged during communication between the
app and the device. Then, we proceeded to inspect the code
and find the structure of the messages. We started from the
network call from Figure 3, whose code is depicted in Listing 4.
It is worth noting that contrary to the Kasa app, which used a
JSON structure for the message, we could not infer the layout
of the message by monitoring the network only, as the message
was in a byte array format.
1 class UdpTransport ... { ...
2 void accept(TargetedMessage targetedMsg) {
3 Message msg = targetedMsg.getMessage();
4 byte[] ba = msg.toData();
5 datagramSocket.send(ba);
6 }
7 ...
8 }
Listing 4: Code used by the LIFX app to construct an UDP
message.
We then inspected the parameter(s) of this method,
TargetedMessage, highlighted in Line 2. We found that the
array of bytes encapsulated on TargetedMessage objects is
partly constructed within classes encoding different operations.
For example, the class SetPower creates a message to modify
the light power whereas the class SetColor creates a message
to modify the light color. For illustration, Listing 5 shows
a fragment of the class SetPower. The layout of messages
can be inferred from the method put. (The construction of
the message header is omitted for brevity.) The sequence of
invocations to method ByteBuffer.put* reflects the order
of fields in the corresponding message. From that, we were
able to replicate the message layout in our script. We used the
same rationale to find the layout for other kinds of messages.
1 class SetPower ... { ...
2 final int SIZE = 6; long duration; int level;
3 void put(ByteBuffer byteBuffer) {
4 byteBuffer.putShort(this.level);
5 byteBuffer.putInt(this.duration);
6 }
7 ...
8 }
Listing 5: Structure of messages used to turn LIFX devices
on and off.
To summarize, we created a proof-of-concept exploit script
to arbitrarily control LIFX smart lights. Similar to the Kasa
exploit described in Section III-C1, we used static analysis
to find a vulnerable path and dynamic analysis to understand
the communication protocol between the LIFX app and the
smart light. To our surprise, we found that the app did not
implement pairing or encryption. Consequently, our script sends
unecrypted commands to change the state of the smart light,
e.g., turning it “on” and “off” and to change the color and
saturation of the light.
3) Exploiting WeMo: WeMo is the official app to control
Belkin devices from the product line WeMo [35], focusing
on a variety of IoT devices in the smart home segment. The
proof-of-concept exploit we developed is a script that arbitrarily
controls a smart plug. As with earlier apps, we started our
analysis by answering the four questions from Section II-B.
Q1) Is the key hardcoded? The WeMo app uses no encryption
or authentication in communication with the device.
Q2) Does the app use local communication? The WeMo app
uses the Universal Plug-and-Play (UPnP) protocol to handle
both device and service discovery on the local network, with
UDP acting as the underlying network protocol.
Q3) Does the app send broadcast messages? Using UPnP
implies that the SSDP protocol is used on the app. As the
SSDP protocol operates with a specific multicast address–
239.255.255.250– broadcast messages are not used.
Q4) Does the app use any well-known protocol with
vulnerabilities? We found that the app uses the UPnP protocol.
Although simple by design, this protocol is known to be
vulnerable. In 2013, a security company discovered that over
80 million devices were susceptible to a UPnP vulnerability
caused by excessive privilege in the network interface of those
devices [36]. They found that this vulnerability was actively
being used in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
The WeMo exploit consists of a script that searches for
a Belkin smart plug on the network and sends commands
for controlling it. To find an attack path, we followed a
different approach from previous exploits. As no encryption
was present, we first monitored the network to identify the
structure of the unencrypted messages. Then, by analyzing the
code responsible for producing the message, we gathered the
necessary information to build the script.
After identifying that the app uses the UPnP protocol, we
first tried to locate classes containing UPnP service names
exposed by the devices (related to Q2). These names identify
the universal device name (udn) [37]. By design, they must
start with the prefix “urn:”. We found that the WeMoDevice
class contained the names of all services related to the Belkin
IoT devices, as seen in Listing 6. This is important as these
names are part of the request sent to the device.
1 public class WeMoDevice { ...
2 AIR_PURIFIER = "urn:Belkin:device:AirPurifier:1";
3 LIGHT_SWITCH = "urn:Belkin:device:lightswitch:1";
4 SWITCH = "urn:Belkin:device:controllee:1";
5 public void setState(String state) {
6 this.mState = state;
7 }
8 ...
9 }
Listing 6: Service names of WeMo devices complete list
was hidden for brevity.
We then monitored the network while interacting with the
WeMo app. By monitoring the packets exchanged and analyzing
the response, we observed that the app specifies a function—
SetBinaryState—to change the state of the device and
another function—GetBinaryState—to obtain the state of
the device. Listing 7 shows the response of the WeMo plug
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while using the app. The response is a SOAP envelope—the
type of message used in the SSDP protocol.
1 <s:Envelope ...>
2 <s:Body>
3 <u:GetBinaryStateResponse ...>
4 <BinaryState>1</BinaryState>
5 </u:GetBinaryStateResponse>
6 </s:Body>
7 </s:Envelope>
Listing 7: WeMo simplified response to query the current
device state.
While inspecting the code looking for the method
SetBinaryState, present in the WeMo response, we found
the class DeviceListManager that receives as parameters
the state and udn of the device and calls the function
makeStateChangeRequest. Listing 8 shows a fragment of
class DeviceListManager. We then analyzed backwards the
call chain from method makeStateChangeRequest leading
to the UI function responsible to turn the smart plug “on”..
The final vulnerable path was hidden for brevity.
1 public class DeviceListManager ... { ...
2 void setBinaryState(String state, String udn) { ...
3 DeviceInformation device = getDeviceUDN(udn,...);
4 makeStateChangeRequest(udn, device.getMAC(),...);
5 }
6 ...
7 }
Listing 8: Class (simplified) responsible for sending the
command to change the state of a WeMo device.
To summarize, we successfully created a proof-of-concept
exploit that discovers WeMo devices compatible with the
SSDP protocol located on the local network and then can
execute arbitrary commands on them. We found that the app
uses the UPnP protocol with well documented vulnerabilities
(see Table I), but we did not end up needing to use those
vulnerabilities in the exploit since the devices also have other
vulnerabilities such as not using encryption.
4) Exploiting e-Control: e-Control is the app [38] responsi-
ble for controlling all devices from Broadlink—a company
specialized in smart home devices and universal remote
controllers. Our exploit was implemented as a script that can
arbitrarily control a Broadlink InfraRed (IR) remote controller.
Similar to previous exploits, we start by answering the questions
of Section II-B.
Q1) Is the key hardcoded? We did not find use of encryption
or authentication in the app.
Q2) Does the app use local communication? With our
protocol discovery component, we found that the e-Control
app uses the QUIC UDP protocol to communicate locally with
Broadlink devices.
Q3) Does the app send broadcast messages? We found
usage of a global broadcast address (similar to the Kasa app),
implying the use of broadcast messages. The obfuscated method
at Line 2 of Listing 9 shows this usage.
Q4) Does the app use any well-known protocol with
vulnerabilities? We did not find usage of protocols with well-
known vulnerabilities in the app.
The e-Control exploit we developed consists of a script
that can send arbitrary commands to a Broadlink IR remote
controller. To create the script, we used the same methodology
as the LIFX exploit, using static analysis to find a vulnerable
path in the app. First, we inspected the code looking for usages
of the UDP protocol, where we found the obfuscated method
a of the class PutInDataUnit, responsible for sending the
UDP packet to the broadcast message (related to Q2 and Q3).
We then analyzed usages of this method. We discovered that
after scanning for devices on the local network, the function
b of the same class was responsible for parsing the device’s
response (structured as a JSON message). Listing 9 shows the
class with both methods. We then analyzed backwards the call
chain involving this class and found the UI call, representing
the start of the vulnerable path. We choose not to show the
graph illustrating the vulnerable path for brevity reasons.
1 public class PutInDataUnit {
2 private Void a() { ...
3 e = new DatagramSocket();
4 e.send(new DatagramPacket(...,"255.255.255.255"));
5 ...
6 }
7
8 private Void b(String... strArr) { ...
9 JSONObject jSONObject = jSONArray.getJSONObject(i);
10 ManageDevice device = new ManageDevice();
11 device.setDeviceName(jSONObject.getString(a.d));
12 ...
13 }
14 }
Listing 9: Class (simplified) responsible for sending an UDP
message through the network.
To discover the structure of the messages, we monitored the
network while interacting with the e-Control app. By inspecting
the JSON messages exchanged, we confirmed the structure
of the message found during our static analysis. We then
replicated this structure to control the device. It is worth noting
that although we found the functions related to the pairing
process while inspecting the code, we did not need to replicate
them on our script. A Broadlink device can be controlled
independently of a previous successful pairing and without
alerting the user. This is a severe flaw.
D. Vulnerability Disclosure
As of the publication deadline of this paper, we have notified
all manufacturers of the vulnerabilities. During disclosure, we
also included scripts showing how to control the device without
the official IoT app and possible approaches to mitigate the
issues we found. None of them have sent any response to our
disclosures and to the best of our knowledge, have not released
patches relative to these vulnerabilities.
E. Threats to Validity and Limitations
The main threats to the validity of this study are the
following. External Validity: We ran this study against five
devices, associated with four different apps. Although we
analyzed more apps (see Section IV), we only purchased
these devices. As usual, the results may not generalize to
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other devices. To reduce bias, we selected smart home devices
according to a well-defined criterion based on popularity in
the Amazon website. It is worth noting that the characteristics
of the apps that control the devices we purchased are similar
to the ones we analyzed but not purchased.
Internal Validity: Our results could be influenced by uninten-
tional mistakes during human inspection. For example, we
could have missed an important vulnerable path in an app.
As for limitations, our infrastructure and methodology do
not account for the possibility of apps making Java Native
Interface (JNI) calls. In this study, none of the apps calls
native functions through JNI. In a complementary study (see
Section IV), however, we found that some apps make JNI
calls. They use JNI, for example, to implement encryption. As
expected, reverse-engineering native code is more challenging.
IV. DISCUSSION
This section describes findings from a larger set of apps
compared to the one used in Section III that enabled us to
construct exploits. In this case, we did not not purchase devices,
so these findings are indicative of the potential extent of
vulnerabilities. IoT devices included cameras, locks, and alarms,
suggesting a significant safety issue if the vulnerabilities we
found were exploitable. We consider companion app analysis to
be a valuable tool for discovering potential vulnerabilities prior
to making purchases of large or expensive smart appliances
or where human safety could be an issue. Our analysis is
conservative with respect to potential vulnerabilities. We only
present a negative result if we can confirm it in code. For
example, by analyzing the eWeLink app, which uses native
code, our analysis was not helpful in analyzing the app for
hardcoded keys and, to be conservative, we counted the app
as not having vulnerabilities to hardcoded keys.
For this experiment, we start with the top-100 smart hubless
devices on the Amazon website by popularity and then restrict
the resulting set to devices that use WiFi and Bluetooth
for communication. We find 96 such devices, including the
5 devices that we previously purchased and analyzed in
Section III. These 96 devices only correspond to 32 companion
apps, saving us significant analysis effort compared to analysis
of devices themselves.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of answers to the questions
for the analyzed apps as pie charts. To answer these questions
we used the same methodology described in Section III.
Considering these questions, we find 31% of the apps to not
use any encryption at all and 19% to use hardcoded keys,
strongly suggesting that at least 50% of the apps are potentially
exploitable with further protocol analysis. These correspond to
37 out of 96 devices, i.e., 38% of the devices.
Out of the 32 apps analyzed, we found 4 apps to use encryp-
tion without hardcoded keys, not use local communication, not
use broadcasts, and not use known insecure protocols. All their
communication was via the cloud service, likely over SSL.
The four apps include the popular Nest app. With respect to
attacks considered in this paper, this is a relatively secure way
to communicate. But it does have a privacy tradeoff in that the
cloud service has access to the commands sent to the device.
Consequently, a potential long-range security risk exists if the
cloud service is ever compromised, a non-negligible risk [39].
We observe that 18 apps communicate locally with their
corresponding device(s) and that 16 apps use broadcasting.
Note that a negative answer to a question does not imply an
exploitable vulnerability. Further inspection is necessary to
understand the issue. For example, although the app “August
Home” uses local communication, that happens only through
Bluetooth, which may restrict an attacker to be in close
proximity to the device, limiting the attack surface. The app
“Ring—Always Home” also does not appear problematic. After
closer inspection, we find that the use of SIP, a protocol known
to be insecure (see Table I) is due to one specific feature of
the app, Voice over IP (VoIP). However, this feature can be
disabled and, if enabled, it is isolated from other parts of the
app (with no apparent flows in between).
V. DEFENSE STRATEGIES
Our analysis suggests that developers of software for IoT
devices find it non-trivial to do proper key management. 50%
of the apps either used hardcoded keys or did not do encryption.
Some apps though did not use hardcoded keys and it is
instructive to see how they secured app-device communication.
We have not found use of a hardcoded key or of local
communication in Nest thermostat’s companion app. The Nest
thermostat provides a UI interface that provides a display and
also entry of data (by rotating a ring around the thermostat).
A user can use that interface that to select a WiFi network
and enter the WiFi password. That allows the device to talk to
the Nest cloud service securely over SSL. The companion app
does not talk directly to the device; instead, the user creates
a free account on the Next cloud service and then signs into
that using the companion app over SSL. Then, the user adds
the thermostat to his account by entering a random code that
is displayed on the thermostat’s interface. The user that way
is assured that the correct thermostat is being added to the
account. Furthermore, the thermostat and the cloud service can
also mutually authenticate each other and establish a shared
secure link. No shared keys between the companion app and the
thermostat are required since, from then on, the communication
between the companion app and the thermostat happens over
SSL links to the cloud service.
The EZVIZ uses a different strategy. Unlike Nest, it supports
local communication between the companion app and the
device over the local network. The shared encryption key
is enclosed in the box in the form of a QR code and must be
scanned by the companion app. This strategy is better than
hardcoded keys provided the key in the QR code is of sufficient
length, random, and strong crypto library is used.
Certain strategies are not recommended. We found several
apps rely on native code. In our current analysis, we did not
analyze native code and thus could have missed some uses
of hardcoded keys. But, it is certainly possible to analyze
binary code using tools such as Ida Pro [40] and extract
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31%
19%
50%
No Encryption (10/32)
Hardcoded Keys (6/32)
No Hardcoded Keys (16/32)
(a) Apps regarding encryption.
56%
44% Local Communication (18/32)
Avoids Local Communication (14/32)
(b) Apps regarding local communication.
46%
54%
Broadcast Messages (15/32)
Avoids Broadcast Messages (17/32)
(c) Apps regarding broadcast messages.
18%
82%
Insecure Protocols (6/32)
Secure Protocols (26/32)
(d) Apps regarding secure protocols.
Figure 4: Distributions of different features for the set of analyzed apps.
potential constants, including keys. Similarly, code obfuscation,
is unlikely to be an adequate defense.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review some of the previous studies on
security in a smart home context.
Denning et al. [3] presented potential security attacks against
smart home devices, pointing that common attacks to traditional
computing platforms, like denial-of-service and eavesdropping
on network could also be used in a smart home context.
Komninos et al. [41] presented a survey about smart home
security, pointing different usage scenarios and categorizing
threats into network domain (such as eavesdroping, traffic
analysis and replay attack) and smart home introduced concept
(such as device impersonation, update and illegal software).
Focusing on IoT platforms, Fernandes et al. [6] analyzed
over 499 apps on SmartThings and found out that 55% of
those are over-privileged largely due to design flaws in the
privilege model of the platform. The authors also demonstrated
how to take advantage of this with four proof-of-concept
attacks, both remotely and locally. Jia et al. proposed a context-
based permission system for appified IoT platforms with fine-
grained context identification and runtime prompts [42]. Other
works [43], [44] focus on program analysis techniques used
on IoT platforms. Most of these works analyze apps written
in platform-dependent and restricted languages whereas we
analyze companion apps in the larger Android platform.
Android apps have been analyzed for a variety of security-
related issues, such as cryptographic misuse [24], [23], [45]
and memory corruption [46]. For example, Egele et al. [24]
analyzed the violation of six rules including the use of ECB
mode and constant keys/IVs/seeds. Wei et al. [23] designed a
static analysis tool for security vetting of Android apps and
used it to detect the use of the weak ECB mode for encryption;
the analysis is intra-procedural and thus limited in scope.
In 2015, the Veracode team published a white paper on
security analysis of six IoT devices to examine vulnerabilities
involving non-use of cryptography, lack of enforcement of
strong passwords, and incorrect TLS certificate validation [47].
The white paper mentions that the team used network moni-
toring and reverse engineering techniques, but did not discuss
details of what was reverse-engineered (e.g., device firmware,
apps, or cloud services) or how. Our work differs in that it
focuses on a different set of vulnerabilities (e.g., many of the
apps we analyzed in 2018 use cryptography, but with hard-
coded keys) and we present details of analysis of companion
apps to show how such vulnerabilities can be discovered.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Securing communication between IoT devices and the mobile
apps responsible for controlling them is crucial for security and
even safety, depending on the types of IoT devices on a network.
Unfortunately, analysis of device firmware is usually non-
trivial. In this study, we showed that analyzing the smartphone
companion apps that are released for the device can provide
important clues for potential vulnerabilities in the devices. By
analyzing the companion app code, we assessed whether the
communication between five best-selling IoT devices and their
companion apps occurs over a secure channel. We found that
was not the case. We were successful in creating exploits for all
five devices and able to control them, leveraging information
that we gathered while analyzing the companion apps, both
statically, through program analysis, and dynamically, through
monitoring the network. We also extended our study to 28
additional apps. We found that 31% of the apps do not use
any crypto to protect the device-app communication and that
19% use hardcoded keys. A significant fraction of the apps
(40–60%) also use local communication or local broadcast
communication, thus providing an attack path to exploit lack
of crypto or use of hardcoded encryption keys.
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